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 Preferencing, Internalization and Inventory Position 
 






We present a model of market-making in which dealers differ by their current inventory 
positions and by their preferencing agreements. Under preferencing, dealers receive captive 
orders that they guarantee to execute at the best price. We show that preferencing raises the 
inventory holding costs of preferenced dealers. In turn, competitors post less aggressive 
quotes. Since price-competition is softened, expected spreads widen. The entry of 
unpreferenced dealers, or the ability to route preferenced orders to best-quoting dealers, as 
internalization does restore price competitiveness. We also show that a greater transparency 
may negatively affect expected spreads, depending on the scale of preferencing. 
 
 






Ce papier analyse les stratégies de cotation de deux teneurs de marché averses au risque qui 
contrôlent leur position en actif risqué sur un marché où sont permis les «  accords de 
préférence »  (preferencing agreements, internalisation). Selon les modalités régissant ces 
accords, un teneur de marché peut recevoir un flux d’ordre préférentiel captif, 
indépendamment du niveau de compétitivité de ses cotations. En contrepartie, il garantit une 
exécution des ordres au meilleur prix du marché. Le papier montre que le preferencing 
augmente les coûts de gestion de la position des teneurs de marché concernés, ce qui diminue 
leur agressivité de cotation. La concurrence en prix faiblit donc, conduisant à l’élargissement 
des fourchettes de prix. Ces effets adverses peuvent être atténués en favorisant l’entrée de 
teneurs de marché non préférencés. En outre, le papier montre qu’une plus grande 
transparence peut exacerber l’impact négatif du preferencing. 
 
 
Mots-clés : Gestion de la position, Internalisation, Microstructure des marchés financiers, 
Pratiques de marché 
 
 
JEL Classification: D43, L21 Preferencing, Internalization and Inventory
Position
Laurence LESCOURRET, and Christian Y. ROBERT∗
Abstract
We present a model of market-making in which dealers diﬀer by their current
inventory positions and by their preferencing agreements. Under preferencing,
dealers receive captive orders, that they guarantee to execute at the best price.
We show that preferencing raises the inventory holding costs of preferenced deal-
ers. In turn, competitors post less aggressive quotes. Since price-competition
is softened, expected spreads widen. The entry of unpreferenced dealers, or the
ability to route preferenced orders to best-quoting dealers, as internalization
does, restore price competitiveness. We also show that a greater transparency
may negatively aﬀect expected spreads, depending on the scale of preferencing.
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1In hybrid markets that combine dealer quotes with order book trading (e.g.,
SuperMontage), several market venues compete with each other to attract incoming
orders. Competing by posting aggressive quotes should ensure that the best-quoting
market center executes the orders. However, the price-setting competition is not so
simple, particularly because of preferencing. Under that practice, brokers routinely
direct or ‘preference’ orders to the market center of their choice, regardless of the
market center’s quoted prices. In return, market centers send cash or non-cash
compensation to brokers for these captive orders, and guarantee them to match
or do better than the best price available.1,2 Yet another subset of preferencing is
internalization in which brokers routes orders to their in-house dealers (i.e., part of
the same broker ﬁrm), without any payment. Preferencing and internalization are
widespread in equity (or option-listed) markets: For instance, approximately 70%
of trades on the London Stock Exchange (LSE) and 70-75% of trading volume on
the Nasdaq is preferenced.3 Besides, 25-40% of total are said to be internalized in
Germany and Netherlands.4
Echoing the debate on preferencing in U.S., internalization has increasingly oc-
cupied the attention of European markets. The new European Directive on Markets
in Financial Instruments (also referred as the MiFID) requires Member States of the
E.U. to allow internalization. It is, however, still unauthorized, in France, Italy and
Spain, where the total order ﬂow must be consolidated, and executed on the main
exchanges. One of the main concern is that preferencing and internalization are
referred to as quote-matching that is known, in industrial organization economics,
to remove incentives to undercut (Salop (1986)). Former SEC Chairman Arthur
Levitt ﬁrst expressed concern about the practice in 1999 when he stressed that, “In
a fragmented market with internalization, preferencing and payment for order ﬂow,
dealers can trade customer orders against their own inventory without routing them
to the best quote. As a result there is less incentive to quote a better price.” Our
paper shows that such concerns are well founded.
The existence of preferencing and internalization raises two questions. First, it
is not clear whether these practices are deleterious for market competition, since
2empirical evidence is mixed. While Klock and McCormick (2002) ﬁnd that Nasdaq
dealers have incentives to be at the inside, just as Hansch et al. (1999) on the Lon-
don Stock Exchange, Chung et al. (2004) show, by using proprietary data provided
by the Nasdaq, that preferencing discourages quote competition. Second, even if
preferenced or internalized trades generate rents for brokers-dealers (otherwise they
would have stopped these pratices), preferencing is not an “unmitigated good” but
rather “a two-edged sword”, as Schwartz and Francioni (2004) point out. Prefer-
encing makes more diﬃcult for dealers to avoid risky extreme positions by choosing
adequatly their bid and ask quotes. Under preferencing, dealers must execute pref-
erenced orders at the best price, regardless of their inventory position. Thus, posting
less aggressive quotes does not ensure market-makers that they will not receive the
next incoming order. Controlling inventory through quotes, which is the main con-
sideration of “inventory” model (see, among others, Ho and Stoll (1981), (1983) or
Biais (1993)), is then much more complex.5 Such an argument is also defended by
Reiss and Werner (1998). In light of these issues, our paper analyzes the impact of
preferencing on the quotes placement strategies of dealers and adresses the follow-
ing issues: How does preferencing aﬀect dealer behavior? How does it impact the
formation of bid-ask spreads?
We study the eﬀect of preferencing on price formation by adapting the inventory
model of Ho and Stoll (1983). The market is transparent: two dealers observe
each other’s inventory position. Dealers choose quotes to cover the cost to produce
liquidity against their own inventory position. The diﬀerence in dealer behavior
comes from the standard divergence in dealers’ inventory position and from the
commitment of a dealer to honor preferencing agreements. In our model, a part of
the order ﬂow sent by risk-neutral liquidity demanders is indeed preferenced, while
the other part is public and routed to the dealer who posts the best price. Thus,
dealers compete in prices for attracting public orders. However, the best price
which is the outcome of the competition is also the execution price of preferenced
trades, even when the dealer is not the best-quoting dealer. Under preferencing,
the preferenced dealer commits to supply liquidity before trading, and, then, must
3provide a best price execution.
We ﬁnd that preferencing reduces the capacity of the preferenced dealer to supply
liquidity to public orders. Since accumulating inventory is risky, posting attractive
quotes for public orders is less feasible since the preferenced dealer is simultaneously
engaged to execute the preferenced transaction on the same side. Namely, as in
Lescourret and Moinas (2006), the dealer faces a risk of dual-liability since she may
enter in two cumulated transactions. Thus, she posts quotes that compensate her
for providing liquidity to both public and preferenced trades. We show that her
quotes are less competitive than in the case where the total order ﬂow would be
consolidated as in Ho and Stoll (1983). The quoting behavior of the preferenced
dealer is perfectly anticipated by the competitor without preferencing, who, in turn,
quotes less aggressively while keeping, in average, a greater chance to win the public
order ﬂow. All dealers have ﬁnally less incentives to quote competitive prices. As a
result, preferencing softens the price competition and widens market spreads to the
detriment of risk-neutral investors. However, the deleterious eﬀect of preferencing
may partially be removed by inducing more competition on the public order ﬂow,
by, for instance, favoring the entry of dealers without preferencing arrangements.
This ﬁnding is similar to the experimental result of Bloomﬁeld and O’Hara (1998).
Then, we test the robustness of the model by varying the level of transparency.
We turn to an opaque market à la Biais (1993), where dealers cannot observe com-
petitors’ inventory position. Despite the simplicity of the economic problem, the
equilibrium pricing strategies of dealers are more complex. Actually the selling
quotes correspond to those arising in an asymmetric ﬁrst price auction. As a con-
sequence, it is impossible to get an analytical solution. However, we completely
characterize the Pareto dominant equilibrium for dealers. Then, we adopt a nu-
merical approach to characterize dealers’ quoting behavior. Results in the opaque
market conﬁrms those obtained in the transparent market. Besides, the opaque
market has the merit to highlight the risk in price execution that the preferenced
dealer faces whenever she matches prices lower than inventory holding costs. For
some levels of the inventory position, the preferenced dealer faces indeed losses in
4executing preferenced trades. This result could explain the zero proﬁt of dealers on
the LSE that Hansch et al. (1998) observe. Moreover, we ﬁnd that transparency
may not enhance price competition in a market with preferencing. The ambiguous
role of transparency in our model has the same ﬂavor as the theoretical results of de
Frutos and Manzano (2002) and the experimental ﬁndings of Bloomﬁeld and O’Hara
(1999) and Kluger and Wyatt (2002).
Finally, our model with preferencing may be extended to analyze internalization.
Unlike preferencing, the dealer is not obliged to execute internalized orders, and may
route them to the best-quoting dealer. Surprisingly, we ﬁnd that internalization is,
in average, less detrimental than preferencing and may even leads to smaller spreads
than in a competitive market in which the order ﬂow is consolidated.
Several theoretical papers examine the eﬀects of order preferencing. Dutta and
Madhavan (1997) study preferencing in a repeated game and show that it facilitates
sustainable collusive equilibria. Preferencing is also proved to weak incentives of
preferenced dealers to quote aggressively in so far as they attract orders without
quoting at the inside (see, for instance Godek (1996) or Kandel and Marx (1997)).
Parlour and Seppi (2003) study preferencing in a hybrid, specialist/limit order mar-
ket and show that preferencing has an ambiguous impact on the cost of liquidity.
Our paper complements these analyses since we present a model of market-making
with preferencing and inventories, in which we take into account the level of pre-
trade transparency. Moreover, in our paper, the additional inventory holding cost
related to preferencing arises endogenously, in contrast to Kandel and Marx (1999),
where it is exogenous.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 1 describes the model and introduces
the benchmark. Section 2 provides the optimal quotes of dealers in a transparent
market with preferencing. Section 2 also explores some extensions and models inter-
nalization. Section 3 is dedicated to the analysis of quoting strategies in an opaque
market. Section 4 concludes. Main proofs are in the Appendix.
5I The Model
A The Basic Setting
Consider the market for a risky asset, whose ﬁnal cash ﬂow is a normal random
variable ˜ v characterized by an expected value   and a variance σ2
v. There are two
types of market participants: (i) investors who demand liquidity and (ii) dealers who
supply liquidity. Liquidity is demanded by risk-neutral investors who are aﬀected
by liquidity shocks. These liquidity traders send market orders to any brokers.
Liquidity is supplied by risk-averse dealers who stand ready to execute incoming
market orders at their bid or ask quote against their own inventory.
Dealers’ reservation price and inventory holding cost. For ease of exposition,
we focus on the sell side of the market and on the behavior of two strategic dealers
who compete to post the lowest selling price (or ask price) so as to execute an
incoming buy order ﬂow. Dealers 1 and 2 are identically risk-averse but diﬀer in
their inventory position. Thus, one of the diﬀerence in dealers’ quoting behavior is
caused by the heterogeneity in their inventory position.
Risk aversion yields dealers to have reservation selling prices.6 Using Ho and








(Q − 2Ii),i = 1,2 (1)
where ρ is the coeﬃcient of risk aversion of dealer i (i = 1,2), Q is the incoming buy
order to accommodate and Ii is dealer i’s initial inventory. Ii is a realization of the
random variable ˜ Ii uniformly distributed on [Id,Iu]. Note that the reservation price is
a one-to-one decreasing function of the inventory position, which yields two remarks.
First, the longer the inventory position, the lower the ask quote. Second, we can,
equivalently, consider that the reservation price a
0|Q





r,d ]. All random variables are independent and their distributions
are common knowledge. The subscript “0|Q” designates the reservation price which
makes the dealer indiﬀerent between trading 0 or trading Q at this price. Note that,
in our setting, there is no asymmetric information on either the value of the risky
asset or the inventory position of dealers.8
6Given that future price movements are uncertain, accumulating inventory in-
creases risks that entail costs for which that dealer has to be compensated. Thus,
the reservation price may be interpreted as the cost to provide liquidity. The dealer
must post ask quotes strictly above the reservation price in order to proﬁtably trade.
Preferenced vs. public order ﬂows and best oﬀer. We make a distinction
between two types of order ﬂows: (i) the preferenced order denoted κ > 0 which
is pre-assigned to dealer 2, and (ii) the public (i.e. unpreferenced) order, denoted
Q > 0, which is exposed to both dealers. Thus, Q is attributed to the dealer who
quotes the lowest ask price (dealer 1 or 2). Besides, the lowest ask price, also termed
best oﬀer, is deﬁned by a ≡ min(a1,a2) where a1 (resp. a2) is the ask price posted
by dealer 1 (resp. dealer 2).
Obligation of execution and preferencing. In practice, under preferencing
dealer 2 is not obliged to take preferenced orders. However, she must still pay her
retail broker for receiving this captive order ﬂow. Moreover, by refusing preferenced
orders, dealer 2 entails the risk to lose the business relationship with the aﬃliated
broker. As the 2001 Nasdaq report points out, preferenced dealers “rarely act in an
agency capacity.” In our paper, we do not model the business relationship between
the broker and the dealer, we assume that the potential cost for the dealer to act
as an agent is higher than the cost to act as a principal. Consequently, under
preferencing, dealer 2 commits to execute preferenced orders before trading, and
does not re-route orders when her inventory position makes preferenced transactions
undesirable (consistently with the hypothesis of Bloomﬁeld and O’Hara (1998) or
Kandel and Marx (1997)).
Best execution duty. According to the usual standards of best execution duty
for retail order ﬂow, dealer 2 guarantees to execute preferenced orders at the best
price available (i.e., the best oﬀer in our model) even when she does not quote it.
The timing of the game and dealers’ payoﬀs. At date 1 dealer i is endowed
with an initial inventory position Ii. At date 2 liquidity traders send the order ﬂow
Q to the market. At the same time a broker sends the preferenced order ﬂow κ to
7dealer 2. Dealer 1 knows that dealer 2 is committed to accommodate the preferenced
transaction κ. At date 3 dealers post simultaneously their ask quotes in order to win
the public order ﬂow Q. The dealer with the lowest ask price executes Q. Besides
dealer 2 executes the transaction κ at the lowest ask price whatever her own quote.9
Dealers are supposed to have linear preferences over the trading proﬁt.10 Never-
theless optimal prices depend on risk aversion since reservation prices depend on risk
aversion. Given that dealer 1 does not execute any preferenced trade, his trading










Q if a1 < a2
0 if a1 > a2
(2)
Dealer 2’ s trading proﬁt diﬀers from dealer 1’ s since she executes for sure at least










(Q + κ) if a2 < a1
(a1 − a
0|κ
r,2)κ if a2 > a1
(3)
When dealer 2 posts the lowest ask price (a2 < a1), she executes both transactions
Q and κ at that price. In the opposite case (a2 > a1), dealer 2 only executes the
preferenced trade κ at the best oﬀer which is the quote posted by her opponent.
Because dealer 2 does not execute the same volume whether she posts the best price
or not, it is natural to consider two reservation prices, corresponding each to the





r,2 is the reservation price to execute the total order ﬂow.
Note that, because dealer 2 must execute the preferenced order κ at the best ask
price, she faces a risk in price execution in so far as she might incur losses (as soon as
a = a1 < a
0|κ
r,2), which is consistent with the remark of Kandel and Marx (1999): “[...]
under preferenced arrangements, a dealer has less control over the trades she has to
accommodate because she cannot withdraw from the market by adjusting quotes.”
Let us introduce a speciﬁc price termed as the cutoﬀ price at which the trading
8proﬁt earned from the execution of the total order ﬂow (Q + κ) is equal to the
trading proﬁt earned in executing only the preferenced order ﬂow κ.
Deﬁnition 1 Let a
κ|Q+κ
r,2 be the value of the ask price at which the preferenced dealer
is indiﬀerent between trading κ or trading (Q + κ). That cutoﬀ price a
κ|Q+κ
r,2 is
















(Q + κ) (4)
which yields a
κ|Q+κ
r,2 =   + ρσ2
v (Q − 2I2)/2 + ρσ2
vκ.11
Suppose that dealer 2 posts a price below the cutoﬀ price a
κ|Q+κ
r,2 and quotes the
best price. Then she executes both transactions Q and κ. However, straightforward
algebra shows that dealer 2 obtains a lower proﬁt in doing so than in executing only
the transaction κ at that price. Thus we can state the following result:
Lemma 1 The preferenced dealer has no incentive to quote below the cutoﬀ price.
Since κ is a captive order ﬂow, the preferenced dealer faces the classic monopolist
dilemma between cost and volume: doing only the transaction κ at a smaller cost
(a
0|κ
r,2) or supplying more (Q + κ) at a greater cost a
0|Q+κ
r,2 . Below the cutoﬀ price,
the cost to execute both transactions is not oﬀset by the increase in the revenue.
Actually the cutoﬀ price is the ‘natural’ reservation price of the preferenced dealer:
That fee compensates her for the impact of a public transaction, Q, and for the
additional inventory risk of trading preferenced orders.12 Consistently, we can write











r,2 )(Q + κ) if a2 < a1,
(a − a
κ|Q+κ









r,2, for each κ.
The ranking is consistent with the monopolistic situation of the preferenced dealer
facing the (inelastic) demand κ. The reservation price a
κ|Q+κ
r,2 , which is the lowest
ask price at which dealer 2 would like to trade Q, is strictly greater than the costs to
9produce liquidity in both cases whether she supplies liquidity for the sole preferenced
order ﬂow κ or for the total order ﬂow (Q + κ).
B The Benchmark: Market-Making Without Preferencing
To examine how preferencing inﬂuences dealer behavior, we ﬁrst analyze a market
in which preferencing is not authorized. We refer to that market as the competitive
case, in which orders must be consolidated and cannot be preferenced. Thus, along
with the transaction Q, the transaction κ is now executed by the best-quoting dealer.
Then, the total quantity to accommodate is (Q + κ). In that case, dealers choose
reservation prices which are equal to a
0|Q+κ












(Q + κ) if ai < a−i
0 if ai > a−i.
(6)





r,d ]. The distribution of reservation prices and the trading
proﬁt function πc
i are the same for all dealers. This situation involves symmetric
dealers. Therefore, we focus on symmetric equilibria.
According to the level of price-quotation disclosure before trading (part of the
regime of the pretrade transparency), equilibrium pricing strategies diﬀer. Fully
transparent markets, in which dealers observe competitors’ quotes (e.g., on a cen-
tralized structure, such as the NYSE), were ﬁrst studied by Ho and Stoll (1983).
In contrast, Biais (1993) deals with optimal pricing strategies in opaque markets
(e.g., fragmented markets, such as the Nasdaq), in which dealers cannot observe
competitors’ quotes.
Proposition 1 (i) (Ho and Stoll (1983)). In a transparent market, optimal quotes

















where ε is positive and arbitrarily small.
(ii) (Biais (1993)). In an opaque market, optimal quotes are strategically equivalent










Ho and Stoll (1983) show that the dealer with the longest inventory position,
or, equivalently, with the lowest reservation price, undercuts the reservation price
of the competitor endowed with the second longest inventory. Thus, the (Nash)
equilibrium strategy results in setting the best oﬀer equal to the second lowest




r,2 ). Besides, Biais (1993)














In the following sections we analyze how preferencing aﬀects dealer quoting strat-
egy, by varying the level of quotes disclosure.
II Preferencing in a Transparent Market
This section assumes that dealers perfectly observe competitors’ inventory positions.
A Optimal Quotes
In our setting the preferenced dealer commits to execute a preferenced order ﬂow κ
before trading, regardless of her quotes. Thus at the reception time of κ, dealer 2
knows that the transaction κ will necessarily shorten her inventory position I2. As a
consequence, dealer 2 raises her reservation price to reﬂect her eﬀective shorter posi-
tion (I2−κ) and her less aggressive willingness to accumulate buy orders. We can in-




r (I2) = a
0|Q
r (I2 − κ)
(see Deﬁnition 1). Since dealer 1 is assumed to observe the magnitude of the pref-
erenced trade, he anticipates correctly how dealer 2 will adjust her quotes upward.





an ask quote just below the second lowest reservation price. In other words, the Nash































where ε is positive and arbitrarily small.
If preferencing is unauthorized (Benchmark), dealer 1 executes the total order
ﬂow (Q + κ) if and only if he is endowed with the longest position, as predicted
by Ho and Stoll. In contrast, under preferencing, dealer 1 wins the public trade
with the shortest position (I1 < I2) as long as his inventory position is longer than
dealer 2’s inventory shortened by the preferenced trade, i.e. I1 ≥ I2 − κ. In that
case, dealer 2 is indeed not induced to undercut her opponent, letting him quoting
the best price. Thus, we conclude that preferencing softens dealers competition by
modifying their capacity to supply liquidity to public investors.
Let us now analyze the impact of preferencing on dealers’ quote aggressiveness.
Corollary 1 The ex ante probability that the preferenced dealer wins the public order
ﬂow is smaller than the ex ante probability that the non preferenced dealer wins the
public order ﬂow.
Corollary 2 The preferenced dealer quotes, ex ante, more aggressively than in the
competitive case while the non preferenced dealer quotes less aggressively.
Preferencing diminishes the capacity to supply liquidity of the preferenced dealer,
which makes dealer 2 less likely to be the best-quoting dealer. She posts, however,
ask quotes closer, in average, to her reservation price a
κ|Q+κ
r,2 than in the competitive
case, i.e. she competes ex ante ‘more’ aggressively. This result can be considered
rather counter-intuitive compared with the arguments of Kandel and Marx (1998) or
Dutta and Madhavan (1997) previously mentioned, but it has to be seen in the light




r,2 that softens the
price agressiveness of dealer 2. Preferencing also alters the quoting behavior of the
12unpreferenced dealer: Dealer 1 posts, in average, higher ask prices, and competes,
ex ante, less aggressively than in the benchmark and than his competitor. Despite
this, dealer 1 is more likely to win the public order ﬂow since he is more likely to
have a low reservation price.
In sum, consistently with concerns of opponents to preferencing, we ﬁnd that
preferencing diminishes incentives to improve quoted prices for all dealers. With a
shortened inventory position, the preferenced dealer is less able to oﬀer competitive
prices to public orders, which is perfectly expected by the opponent who posts less
aggressive prices.
B Market Performance
This section analyzes the impact of preferenced trades on the overall market per-
formance by using the benchmark. Given Theorem 1, the best oﬀer is equal to




r,1 ). The next corollary
analyzes the impact of preferencing on the expected best oﬀer E (a).
Corollary 3 The expected best oﬀer is larger as preferencing is increasing, i.e.
∂E (a)/∂κ > 0. Moreover, the expected best oﬀer is higher in a market with pref-





Increasing the scale of preferencing increases the best ask price. In a symmetric
way, it will decrease the best bid price. Hence, preferencing widens the expected
bid-ask spreads, which is consistent with the decrease of dealers’ incentives to narrow
quoted spreads with preferencing. Thus, preferencing in a fully transparent market
leads to an increase in transaction costs for investors. This supports the point of
view of Huang and Stoll (1996) or He, Odders-White and Ready (2006) who argue
that larger execution costs on Nasdaq relative to NYSE, where preferencing is less
pervasive, are at least partially due to this market practice.
Given that liquidity traders are risk-neutral, they obviously prefer a market
where preferencing is not authorized since it would minimize execution costs gener-
13ated by market spreads. They do not control however for preferencing agreements
between brokers and dealers.13 Turning to the case of dealers, these agents will
prefer the market structure where their expected proﬁt is larger.
Corollary 4 (a) The dealer prived from preferenced trades prefers a market with





, if and only if the preferenced order ﬂow is
such that: κ ≥ κ(Q), where κ(Q) is detailed in the Appendix.







Preferencing increases the expected proﬁt of the preferenced dealer even if she
has less control on the price execution of preferenced transactions. Actually, in this
transparent two-dealer market, there is no risk in price execution: In case dealer 2
does not post the best price, the best oﬀer to match is equal to her cutoﬀ price,





r,2). From the unpreferenced dealer’s perspective, two opposite eﬀects
interplay: On one hand, relative to the competitive case, dealer 1 loses the potential
trading proﬁt on the transaction κ which is exclusively preferenced to his opponent.
On the other hand, he beneﬁts from the softeness of price-competition since, ex ante,
he posts less aggressive prices while keeping a greater chance to win the public order
ﬂow. There exist cases where the beneﬁts outweights the costs of preferencing. In
these cases, the expected proﬁt of dealer 1 is larger than in the competitive case.
Thus, preferencing may enrich all dealers.
These results show that preferencing aﬀects (i) the market performance since
it enlarges market spreads to the detriment of investors, and (ii) dealers’ proﬁt.
These results provide a theoretical support to the experimental ﬁndings of Bloom-
ﬁeld and O’Hara (1998). Using laboratory ﬁnancial markets, their research shows
that in a two-dealer market, increasing preferencing increases dramatically market
spreads and enriches dealers at the expense of investors. However, they ﬁnd also that
these deleterious eﬀects may be avoided when more than one dealer do not receive
preferenced orders. We will study later whether this is the case in our framework.
14C Further Analysis
In this section we are interested in, ﬁrst, generalizing the model to derive empirical
implications and, then, in examining an alternative formulation of the model in order
to get some intuitions on the impact of internalization, another form of preferencing,
on price formation.
C.1 More than 2 dealers
The previous setting at 2 dealers can easily be extended to N dealers. Suppose
that N dealers compete to execute the public order ﬂow Q. Among the N dealers,
M dealers have preferencing arrangements where M ≤ N. Each of the M dealers
receives a preferenced order ﬂow denoted κi for i = 1,...,M.
Following Lemma 1, the preferenced dealer i will not quote below the cutoﬀ
price a
κi|Q+κi
r,i (i = 1,...,M). The remaining (M − N) dealers who do not get any
preferenced order ﬂow are characterized by the Ho and Stoll’s (1983) reservation
price: a
0|Q
r,i , i = M+1,...,N. Observe that the reservation price of an unpreferenced
dealer is simply equal to the reservation price of a dealer whose preferenced order




r,i when κi = 0 for i = M + 1,...,N. Consequently,
to ease the exposition of the results, we denote by a
κi|Q+κi
r,i the reservation price of
any dealer i for i = 1,...,N.
Proposition 2 In a transparent market where a part of the total order ﬂow is pref-




r,i ), denoted by T,
posts the best price and executes the public part of the order ﬂow. At equilibrium,
the best-quoting dealer undercuts the second-lowest reservation price and the (N − 1)








r,i , for i ∈ [1;N]\{T}
(11)
where ε is positive and arbitrarily small.
The ranking of dealers’ eﬀective inventory positions (Ii − κi)i∈[1;N] determines







, which, in turn, yields the
15outcome of the quote-competition between dealers at date 3. Notice that the best-
quoting dealer is the dealer with the longest eﬀective inventory position (IT − κT) =
max
i∈[1;N]
(Ii − κi), which is not necessarily the dealer with the most extreme inventory
at date 1.
Proposition 2 is useful to draw empirical predictions about the relationship be-
tween inventories, quotes and preferenced order ﬂow. Besides, it allows us to examine
how preferencing aﬀects the market competitiveness when there are more than one
dealer without preferenced trades.
C.2 Testable link
In the benchmark model based on Ho and Stoll (1983) dealers’ quotes can be ex-
pressed as a monotonic function of their initial inventory positions. Hansch et al.
(1998) show that there exists a simple relationship between the relative positioning
of dealers’ quotes and their relative inventory level, as follows
ai − a = F (Ii − IT) (E1)
where the position of the quote ai posted by dealer i relative to the lowest ask
price (a) posted by the best-quoting dealer T depends monotonically (through the
decreasing function F) on the diﬀerence between the level of his inventory Ii relative
to the inventory of the best-quoting dealer, IT.14 Note that dealer T is also endowed
with the longest inventory position in this case.
Testing the previous equation on a dataset from the London Stock Exchange,
Hansch et al. ﬁnd that the dealers with extreme inventory position execute only
about 59% of the incoming public orders. They argue that preferencing may cause
this invalidation.15 Our analysis seems to conﬁrm their hypothesis: A direct impli-
cation of Proposition 2 is that the link between inventories and quotes is impacted
by preferencing, as follows
ai − a = F ((Ii − κi) − (IT − κT)) (E2)
where κi and κT are respectively the preferenced trades executed by dealer i and
by the best-quoting dealer T. We suggest that for stocks with preferencing, dealers’
16inventories should be shortened by the scale of preferenced trades in order to test a
relation between the positioning of quotes and the level of dealers’ inventories.16
C.3 A Numerical Example
To obtain some intuitions on the role of preferencing in a multiple-dealers market
and illustrate Proposition 2, we consider a numerical example where the number of
dealers N is ﬁxed to 2, then to 3, and other parameters as follows: ρ = 1,   = 99.75$,
σ2
v = 1/10,000, Q = 2,500, Id = 0, and Iu = 20,000. Then, to determinate whether
the number of preferenced vs. unpreferenced dealers matters, we vary the number
of preferenced dealers M while ﬁxing the scope of preferencing (in case M = 1, the
preferenced dealer receives κ, and in case M = 2, two preferenced dealers receive
κ/2).
As Figure 1 illustrates, increasing the volume of preferenced trades increases the
expected best oﬀer, irrespective of the total number of dealers. We also observe
that the addition of one more dealer (from N = 2 to N = 3) increases compe-
tition and lowers the expected best oﬀer (as demonstrated, for instance, by Biais
(1993)). However, the expected best oﬀer in the "(κ/2,κ/2,0)" setting is higher
than in the "(0,κ,0)" setting supporting the intuition that as the number of deal-
ers without preferenced orders rises, the expected ask price falls. Actually when





r,u ) which enables the sole unpreferenced dealer to choose non-competitive
quotes. In the "(0,κ,0)" setting there are two dealers who are more likely to draw
low reservation prices: The addition of a second unpreferenced dealer puts compet-
itive pressure on the other unpreferenced dealer, which eventually reduces average
bid/ask spreads. Thus the number of unpreferenced vs. preferenced dealers aﬀects
the level of competition. This result is also consistent with the experimental ﬁnding
of Bloomﬁeld and O’Hara (1998) mentioned above.
[INSERT FIGURE 1.]
17D Internalization
One extension of the model is to consider internalization, which turns out to be a
speciﬁc type of preferencing arrangements. Internalization consists of a situation
in which retail orders are executed by the brokerage ﬁrm itself either against its
customers’ orders or against its own position. An analysis of the impact of inter-
nalization on the price formation is crucial to understand the reform at stake in
Europe, since the MiFID is deeply reshaping the organization of European ﬁnancial
markets.
Along with preferencing, internalization is one of the most controversial features
of the recent development of ﬁnancial markets. This practice is problematic for
similar reasons. First, it is a source of market fragmentation, which impairs price-
competition, price discovery and should weaken incentives of liquidity suppliers to
cut prices (see Biais and Davydoﬀ (2002), or Lee (2002)). In addition, ﬁrms are
suspected to internalize only proﬁtable uninformed retail orders, which aﬀects ad-
versely market quality (Chakravarty and Sarkar (2002)). Finally, as a subset of pref-
erencing, internalization also consists in quote matching. As such, internalization
is suspected to maintain higher market spreads (see Spatt (2005)).17 The present
sub-section deals with the last issue and addresses two speciﬁc questions: How does
internalization interact with price competition? Is it more or less detrimental than
preferencing?
This sub-section assumes that, at date 1, dealer 2 may ﬁll the transaction κ
in-house by matching the best available price. However, unlike preferencing, inter-
nalization is not mandatory. Dealer 2 has the option to pass the order ﬂow κ to the
best-quoting dealer, consistently with the experimental design of Kluger and Wyatt
(2002). Thus, she internalizes κ only when it interests her. Hence, dealer 2’s trading
proﬁt is such that:
π2 (a2,a1,I2) =

   











r,2 < a1 < a2




18Since dealer 2 is not forced to ﬁll in-house orders, she routes κ to the best-quoting
dealer, as soon as she would incur trading losses (a = a1 < a
0|κ
r,2). This option is
obviously proﬁtable for dealer 2, but also for the rival. Dealer 1 perfectly anticipates
that dealer 2 refuses to ﬁll κ in-house under a certain level of prices. Thus, dealer 1
knows that he may choose prices that attract the transaction κ. The trading proﬁt
function of the non internalizing dealer writes:
π1 (a2,a1,I1) =

   















r,2 < a1 < a2
0 if a1 > a2
(13)
Having characterized dealer trading proﬁt functions, let us turn to the determi-
nation of optimal quotes.
Proposition 3 In a market where dealer 2 internalizes the transaction κ > 0, the
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   
a
0|κ








































where ε is positive and arbitrarily small.
Dealer 2 has a strategy similar to the case of preferencing. She faces, however, no
risk in price execution since she routes κ to dealer 1 whenever she cannot proﬁtably
trade κ. This mechanism restores price competition, since, whenever his inventory
position is long enough, dealer 1 is induced to post aggressive prices to attract the
transaction κ. There exist even situations in which dealer 1 posts a very aggres-
sive price and the best oﬀer is lower (ex post) than in the competitive case with




r,2 ). In agreement with this result, Kluger
and Wyatt (2002) remark also that, during their experiment, “some markets with
internalization can be virtually indistinguishable from highly competitive markets.”
19We also ﬁnd that higher best oﬀers may be maintained, depending on the inventory
position of dealers in competition. The next corollary analyzes how internalization
aﬀects, ex ante, the best oﬀer.
Corollary 5 The expected best oﬀer is lower in a market with internalization than
in a market with preferencing, and may even be lower than the expected best oﬀer
in a competitive market
Our result is consistent with the previous remark on the possibility of very com-
petitive markets under internalization. It is, however, at odd with the usual position
that internalization, as quote-matching, hurts price competition. But it may explain
why empirical evidence are mixed. While Chung et al. (2004) ﬁnd that internaliza-
tion may aﬀect negatively expected spreads on Nasdad, Chung et al. (2006b) fail
to show that internalization diminishes dealers’ incentives to post aggressive prices,
and Hansch et al. (1999) ﬁnd that internalized trades receive better execution than
non-internalized trades.
III Preferencing in an Opaque Market
It is well-known that the level of transparency has an eﬀect on the quoting behavior
of dealers (see, e.g., Simaan, Weaver and Whitcomb (2003)). As Biais (1993) notes,
in an opaque market (e.g., a fragmented market such as the Nasdaq) dealers have to
set their quotes by estimating rivals’ inventory positions, rather than by observing
inventory positions. In our model, the preferenced dealer can only form an expecta-
tion on the best price at which she could be constrained to execute the preferenced
transaction in case she does not post the best price. Does the opaqueness of a market
with preferencing enhance competition among dealers or does it even more weaken
the quote aggressiveness of dealers?
Dealer 1 executes the public transaction when his ask price is lower than his
competitor’s ask price, as described by the proﬁt function π1 deﬁned in Equation
(2). In an opaque market, dealer 1 has to compute the probability of this event that














On the other hand, dealer 2 must determine her ask price given (i) her probability
to win the public transaction, denoted Pr(a2 < a1) and (ii) the obligation to exe-
cute the preferenced transaction even when she does not post the best price, which
happens with probability Pr(a2 > a1). Thus, given the trading proﬁt function π2







= Pr(a2 < a1)(a2 − a
κ|Q+κ







κ(Q + κ). (17)
Note that dealers’ expected trading proﬁts are twice asymmetric. First the
expected proﬁt functions are not symmetric (due to the diﬀerent trading proﬁt
functions π1 and π2). Second, recalling that dealer 2 will never quote under the
reservation price a
κ|Q+κ
r,2 (Lemma 1), the reservation prices of dealers are also asym-
metric. Namely, reservation prices are not deﬁned on the same distribution sup-
port. Thus we make a distinction between F, the uniform cumulative distrib-




r,d ], and Fκ,





that the distribution support of the reservation price of dealer 2 is “shifted” to the












Due to this double asymmetry, the equilibrium quote-setting strategies are ob-
tained in closed-form solutions only in some special cases. Numerical investigation
is provided in the alternative cases.
A Optimal Quotes in an Opaque Market
This section provides the detailed analysis of the equilibrium that consists of a








r,d ] −→ IR. We
21assume that the ask strategies are increasing functions (see Lebrun (1999) for formal
proofs). Then we can deﬁne the inverse quoting functions, which are more convenient
to analyze. Consequently, we denote v1(y) and v2(y) the reservation prices drawn
respectively by dealer 1 and dealer 2, that lead them to quote y. Note that v1 =
(a1)
(−1) and v2 = (a2)
(−1). Observe that the probability that dealer 1 (resp. 2)
wins writes Pr(y < a2) = Pr(v2 (y) < a
κ|Q+κ
r,2 ) = 1 − Fκ (v2 (y)) ≡   Fκ (v2 (y)) (resp.
1 − F (v1 (y)) ≡   F (v1 (y))).
The (Bayes-Nash) equilibrium is deﬁned by the couple of inverse functions (v1,v2)



































































=   F (v1 (y))(y − a
κ|Q+κ
r,2 )(Q + κ) +
 
1 −   F (v1 (y))
 







κ(Q + κ). (19)
Technically, as mentioned by Biais (1993), prices arising in this context corre-
spond to those arising in a Dutch auction, which is strategically equivalent to a
sealed-bid ﬁrst-price auction. Under preferencing, the equilibrium quotation strate-
gies are more complex because of asymmetries in the trading proﬁt functions of
dealers and in the support of the distribution of the reservation price of dealers. It
is well-known that asymmetries preclude analytical solutions for ﬁrst-price auctions,
except for very simple models (see Lebrun (1999), Maskin and Riley (2000), and
Cantillon (2006)). Therefore, we use a numerical approach based on Marshall et
al. (1994) to derive equilibrium quoting strategies. In our setting, it is, however,
22possible to characterize analytical equilibrium strategies in two cases: (i) when the
preferenced order ﬂow is so large that the preferenced dealer cannot proﬁtably exe-
cute the public order (κ ≥ 2(Iu − Id)) and (ii) in the competitive benchmark where
preferencing is unauthorized. The cut—oﬀ (κ < 2(Iu − Id) or κ ≥ 2(Iu − Id)) will
be economically justiﬁed below.
When preferencing is small, i.e. κ < 2(Iu − Id). Dealers’ ask strategies have
the same domain of values
 
ainf,asup 
. On this support, both dealers have a positive
probability to execute public orders.
The lower bound ainf is the lowest possible ask price quoted by a dealer and it









= 1. Intuitively, if dealer 1 should
post a lower price than dealer 2 (ainf
1 < ainf
2 ), then he could quote any price a1
∈ [ainf
1 ,ainf
2 [ and be sure to post the best price. However, this strategy is strictly





/2. Hence, it cannot be an equilibrium by
elimination of iterated dominated strategies (the same holds in case ainf
1 > ainf
2 ). As
a result, dealers’ optimal quotes must have the same lower bound ainf.
The upper bound asup is the largest possible ask price quoted by a dealer who has
a positive probability to execute the public order ﬂow. This upper bound is deﬁned
such that   Fκ (v2 (asup))   F (v1 (asup)) = 0. Using the same argument as before, we
conclude that dealers must quote no more than the largest possible ask price to have
a chance to execute public orders.
Proposition 4 Assume that preferencing is small, i.e. κ < 2(Iu − Id). Then
(i) The equilibrium inverse ask functions v1 and v2 are solutions to the following
pair of non-linear ordinary diﬀerential equations:
  F′
κ (v2 (y))
  Fκ (v2 (y))
v′
2 (y) = −
1
y − v1 (y)
, (20)
  F′ (v1 (y))
  F (v1 (y))
v′
1 (y) = −
(1 + κ/Q)
y − v2 (y)
. (21)




r,d )/2, there exists an equilibrium.
First, note that the equilibrium is not necessarily unique and that the lower











Observe also that when the reservation price drawn by dealer 2 is greater than
the largest possible ask price (a
κ|Q+κ
r,2 > asup), then dealer 2 cannot win the public
order Q and she quotes her reservation price: a2 = a
κ|Q+κ
r,2 . Moreover, when the
lowest reservation price possibly drawn by dealer 2 is still larger than the largest





r,d )/2 or, equivalently, κ ≥ 2(Iu − Id),
dealer 2 can never proﬁtably execute the public order ﬂow by posting the lowest ask
price and the equilibrium described in Proposition 4 degenerates.18 (See Proposition
5 below).
The following theorem determinates the equilibrium which is more likely to be
selected by dealers among the multiplicity of equilibria described in Proposition 4.
Theorem 2 The unique Pareto dominant equilibrium, from the point of view of





The Pareto dominant equilibrium is the equilibrium that maximizes both deal-
ers’ expected proﬁt. It is worth stressing two facts about this dominant equilibrium.
First, as presumed above, it is impossible to get an analytical solution to this asym-
metric equilibrium (at least we have not been able to ﬁnd one). Second, given that
preferencing makes dealers asymmetric, they have diﬀerent quoting behaviors, as
Figure 2 illustrates. Precisely, our model combines two kinds of asymmetries which
generate for the preferenced dealer an ambiguous quoting behavior. On one side,
preferencing forces her to post, on average, more aggressive ask prices even if it can-
not outweigh the fact that she is less likely, ex ante, to win the public order ﬂow (due
to the asymmetry in the distribution supports of dealers’ reservation price). On the
other side, the preferenced transaction creates a rent for dealer 2 that diminishes, in
the opaque market, her incentive to compete in prices (asymmetry in trading proﬁt
function). Note that the combination of two diﬀerent asymmetries invalidates any
24utilization of the Conditional Stochastic Dominance, which would have helped to
compare analytically dealers’ quoting behaviors (see, for instance, Maskin and Riley
(2000)).
Finally, we mention that the competitive case of Biais (1993) described in Propo-
sition 1 (ii) is a special case of our model. Namely, dealers are symmetric in the
benchmark. By using identical inverse ask functions to solve the equilibrium (i.e.,
v1 = v2 = vB, with vB =
 
aB (−1)), the pair of Equations (20) and (21) reduces to
the following single diﬀerential equation:
  F′  
vB (y)
 






y − vB (y)
, (22)








and asup,B = a
0|Q+κ
r,d . (23)
It is easy to verify that the symmetric equilibrium characterized by Equations (22)
and (23) is unique. Furthermore, there exists an analytical solution, which is linear
in reservation prices, and identical to the optimal quotes of Biais (see Equation
(8)). Combining in Figure 2 dealers’ quoting strategies in the Biais case and in
the preferencing case, we observe that the unpreferenced dealer posts less aggressive
prices than in the benchmark, while the price aggressiveness of the preferenced dealer
depends on the level of her inventory: For some extreme inventory positions, she
may post more aggressive prices than in the benchmark, in accordance with the
impact of the double asymmetry discussed above. However, in the general case,
under preferencing, dealers post less competitive prices.
[INSERT FIGURE 2.]
When preferencing is large, i.e. κ ≥ 2(Iu − Id). In that case, Proposition 4
fails, but we are able to characterize the equilibrium in closed form, as the next
proposition shows.
Proposition 5 Assume that preferencing is large, i.e. κ ≥ 2(Iu − Id). Then, dealer
2 quotes an ask price equal to her reservation price: a2 = a
κ|Q+κ




25When the portion of the captive order ﬂow is too large, it precludes any price
competition between dealers. When dealer 1 does not quote above than the lowest
possible reservation price drawn by the preferenced dealer, he is sure to post the
best price and to execute public trades. Moreover dealer 2 posts her reservation
price since she cannot proﬁtably win the public order ﬂow anyway.
B Preferencing, Market Performance, and Transparency
Now, we analyze how the quote transparency alters market spreads and dealers’
proﬁts regarding preferencing.
The expected best oﬀer. First, whatever the level of transparency, the expected
best oﬀer is found to be higher in a market with preferencing than in a competitive
market, which is consistent with the previous remarks on the negative impact of
preferencing on dealers’ price competitiveness.
Second, the level of transparency has an ambiguous impact on the expected best
oﬀer in a market depending on the magnitude of preferencing. When preferencing
is small, numerical analysis show that the transparent market may oﬀer a lower
expected best oﬀer than the opaque market (see Figure 3). The reverse is (analyt-
ically) true when preferencing is large (κ ≥ 2(Iu − Id)). Recall that, in that case,
the preferenced dealer can never proﬁtably execute the public order ﬂow, and her
strategy is to quote her reservation price in the transparent or in the opaque market.
However, transparency plays a non negligeable role since it helps dealer 1 to choose
an even less competitive ask price than in the opaque markets. (See the optimal
quotes of Theorem 1 vs. Proposition 5). Namely, transparency removes dealer 1’s
uncertainty about the level of the non competitive quote posted by dealer 2. Kluger
and Wyatt (2002) also ﬁnd that, when a non-competitive outcome occurs among
preferenced and unpreferenced dealers, expected spreads are wider in a transparent
market than in a more opaque market. Above all, this result suggests that regulating
preferencing or internalization by providing rules on transparency, as the MiFID is
implementing in Europe, may have opposite eﬀects on transaction costs, depending
on the magnitude of the preferenced order ﬂow in the market.
26Finally, we show that expected best oﬀers in the transparent and opaque mar-
ket are not equal, in contrast to Biais’s (1993) irrelevance proposition of market
structures. In the symmetric setting of the benchmark, the “revenue-equivalence
theorem” in auction holds, as Biais mentions it. Therefore, any opaque or transpar-
ent market structures yields the same expected best oﬀer. In our model, preferencing
creates asymmetries, which are known to prevent the revenue-equivalence theorem
to prevail (see, e.g., Maskin and Riley (2000)).
[INSERT FIGURE 3]
Dealers’ expected proﬁt. Direct algebra shows that when preferencing is large
(κ ≥ 2(Iu − Id)), dealer 1 and 2 prefer the transparent market since they compete
less aggressively in that case and enjoy higher expected proﬁts. When preferencing
is small, we still numerically validate that dealer 1 prefers the transparent market
(consistently with results obtained in auction theory by Maskin and Riley (2000)).
In contrast, the expected proﬁt of dealer 2 may be higher in the opaque market,
depending on the magnitude of the preferenced order ﬂow.
What is worth stressing is that dealer 2 may incur losses in executing her pref-
erenced transaction in the opaque market. For some levels of her inventory, she
matches the best price posted by her opponent which may be lower than her reser-
vation price. This result is consistent with the empirical evidence of Hansch et al.
(1999) who ﬁnd that preferenced dealers on the LSE make zero proﬁts over all trades.
Note that (i) losses are not enough to outweigh the preference of dealer 2 for the
opaque market in some cases ; (ii) losses could even be bigger if we assumed that
dealer 1 cannot observe whether a preferenced order ﬂow is received or not by dealer
2, since the best price to match would be even more competitive.
IV Conclusion
This paper investigates how preferencing alters the quoting behavior of two dealers
with diﬀerent inventory positions. Dealers are supposed to undercut each other’s
27quote to accommodate an incoming order ﬂow. However, part of this order ﬂow
is not exposed to the whole market and is already pre-assigned to one of the two
dealers. In accordance with best execution standards, that dealer has guaranteed in
advance (before trading) to match the best price in executing the preferenced order
ﬂow. That best price is, however, the outcome of the price-competition that takes
place for absorbing the unpreferenced part of the order ﬂow. In our framework, pref-
erencing is analyzed as a price-matching practice which generates inventory risks for
the dealer with preferenced trades, that even may entail losses for that agent. We
ﬁnd that preferencing makes diﬃcult for preferenced dealers to attract public orders
by moving quotes, which weakens price competition among dealers. Therefore, con-
sistently with institutional concerns, we show that preferencing generates negative
eﬀects on the market performance: It widens market spreads, and leads dealers to
earn larger trading proﬁts due to (i) the compensation for the additional risk asso-
ciated with preferencing, and (ii) the softer price competition. Besides, preferencing
makes the market mechanism fail to allocate eﬃciently the order ﬂow, since the
dealer with the extreme inventory position is not necessarily the dealer who posts
the best price, which is in contrast to Ho and Stoll (1983), but in accordance with
the empirical results of Hansch et al. (1998). We also show that a lower degree of
pre-trade transparency does not alter the results, and may even be less detrimen-
tal for expected spreads. Nevertheless preferencing has less eﬀects in markets with
multiple unpreferenced dealers, or, in markets in which dealers have the option to
route preferenced orders to best-quoting dealers, as internalizing dealers do.
Preferencing essentially makes brokers’ search eﬀorts for best execution negli-
gible, but yields to supra-competitive prices. As as consequence, even if investors
could beneﬁt from a minimized search cost from brokers, they lose from dealers quot-
ing larger spreads. As argued in the paper, maintaining a high level of competition
in the central market and limiting the number of dealers with preferenced trades
help to prevent the negative eﬀects of this practice. We also would like to stress
that the increasing use of smart order routing systems could change the economics
of this practice and replace this type of arrangements between brokers and dealers
28on the execution of retail orders. Brokers will balance the cost of acquisition of a
smart order routing system associated with the cost of losing dollar or soft-dollar
rebates provided by preferenced dealers, with the beneﬁt to attract more clients by
providing the “best execution”.
Finally, to determine whether internalization is good or not for markets is not
straightforward. Internalization allows broker-dealer to save the costs of executing
orders on an exchange and to earn bid-ask spreads. If brokers-dealers rebate these
savings to their clients, the total trading cost could be all the more reduced since
internalization is less detrimental than preferencing. Whether the whole rebate is
passed on to clients is questionable.
V Appendix
Preliminary Remarks. (i) Recall that F (resp. Fκ) is the uniform distribution













r,d ]). We denote by f (resp. fκ) the respective density function




r,d , S and Sκ are separated.
Proof of Lemma 1. Straightforward.
Proof of Proposition 1: See Ho and Stoll (1983) and Biais’s (1993) Proposition
1.
Proof of Theorem 1: Consider two cases separately.
CASE 1: κ ≤ (Iu − Id). Let us show that a2 given by Equation (10) is a best reply





r,1 . In case dealer 2 chooses an ask price stricly lower than
dealer 1’s quote (a2 < a1 = a
0|Q
r,1 ), she wins the public order ﬂow with probability 1.
In that case, it is optimal to choose the ask price which is the closest than dealer
1’s quote. Thus, we deduce that the best reply is a2 = a
0|Q
r,1 − ε, where ε may be
interpreted as the minimum regulatory tick size in the market. In case dealer 2
chooses an ask price equal or larger than dealer 1’s quote (a2 ≥ a1 = a
0|Q
r,1 ), she is





r,1 . Dealer 1’s strategy is to post: a1 = a
κ|Q+κ
r,2 − ε.
If dealer 2 chooses an ask price stricly lower than a1, then she must execute the
public order ﬂow with probability 1. Her trading proﬁt is, however, lower than
the trading proﬁt obtained by avoiding any deviation:
 














Similarly, we can prove that a1 given by Equation (9) is a best reply to dealer
2’s strategy a2.
CASE 2: κ > (Iu − Id). Dealer 1 posts the best price with probability 1 and quotes
a1 = a
κ|Q+κ




Proof of Corollary 1: Consider two cases.
CASE 1: κ ≤ (Iu − Id). The ex ante probability that dealer 1 posts the lowest ask
price is:




































whereas dealer 2 is the best-quoting dealer with the following ex ante probability
Pr(a2 < a1) = 1 − Pr(a1 < a2) < 1/2.
CASE 2: κ > (Iu − Id). Pr(a1 < a2) = 1 and Pr(a2 < a1) = 0. Q.E.D.
Proof of Corollary 2. Let θi(a
.|.




r,i) be the expected distance
between the ask price posted by dealer i and his/her reservation price . The average
price aggressiveness of dealer i is deﬁned as E (θi). The interpretation is straight-
forward: The lower is the coeﬃcient, the closer is the ask price from the reservation
price, and the more aggressive is dealer i’ s price. First, we write down dealers’ price


















































































, for i = 1,2.
(A2)
Second, we analyze the price aggressiveness of dealer 1 relative to the benchmark.
We must consider 2 cases separately:

















































































































































After straightforward computations, we get
E (θ1) = θHS + g(ρσ2
vκ), (A3)













− x3 for x ∈
 
0,ρσ2
v (Iu − Id)
 
. (A4)
Moreover, if we diﬀerentiate it, we have




















31Observe that g′ (0) > 0 and g′  
ρσ2
v (Iu − Id)
 
> 0. It follows that g′ (x) is positive
for each x ∈
 
0,ρσ2
v (Iu − Id)
 
. Hence, g is increasing on
 
0,ρσ2
v (Iu − Id)
 
and goes





























Thus, we deduce that












Third, we turn to the price agressiveness of dealer 2 by considering two cases.
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Proof of Corollary 3: Let us proceed in two steps:
STEP 1: First, we characterize the expected best oﬀer in a market with preferencing,
by considering two cases:













































































CASE 2: κ > (Iu − Id). Using Theorem 1, the optimal ask strategies of dealers 1
and 2 lead the best oﬀer to be equal to






















and we deduce that ∂E (a)/∂κ > 0.
STEP 2: Second, we compare E (a) with the expected best oﬀer wich prevails in the
benchmark. From Proposition 1 (i), we deduce that the expected best oﬀer in the







r,u )/3. Let us consider two cases
separately.
CASE 1: κ ≤ (Iu − Id). Let ψ(κ) = E (a)−E
 
aHS 































Observe that ψ(0) = 0 and ψ(Iu − Id) > 0. Then, we deduce that ψ(κ) > 0 for













Proof of Corollary 4. From Proposition 1(i), dealers’ expected proﬁts are sym-
metric and we deduce that: E(ΠHS) = ρσ2
v (Iu − Id)(Q + κ)/6. In order to deter-
mine whether dealers prefer a market with or without preferencing, we ﬁrst compute
dealer i’s expected proﬁt in a market with preferencing (Step i.1) and, then, we turn
to the comparison with the benchmark (Step i.2).
STEP 1.1: Dealer 1’ s expected proﬁt in a market with preferencing.






































































































































































f (x)dx)Q = ρσ2
vκQ. (A11)
STEP 1.2: Comparison of dealer 1’s expected proﬁts in the benchmark and
in the transparent market with preferencing. After straightforward manipu-
lation, we get



































with the following values at bounds gQ (0) = (3 − (Iu − Id)/Q)/6 and gQ (κ) →
1 − (Iu − Id)/6Q as κ → ∞. Now, note that gQ (Iu − Id) = (5 − (Iu − Id)/Q)/6.













6κ2 1 lκ>(Iu−Id) > 0.
Thus, we deduce that the sign gQ(κ) depends on the value of the parameter Q:
34• If Q ≥
(Iu−Id)
3 , then, given that gQ(0) > 0, gQ (κ) is increasing from 0, and we






• If Q <
(Iu−Id)
3 , straightforward computations show that we must consider three
diﬀerent cases: (i) if
(Iu−Id)
5 ≤ Q <
(Iu−Id)





for κ ≥ κ∗ (Q),












6 < Q <
(Iu−Id)
5 , then





if κ ≥ κ∗∗ (Q), where and κ∗∗ (Q) =
(Iu−Id)Q
(6Q−(Iu−Id)) ; (iii) Q <
(Iu−Id)











for κ ≥ κ(Q), where
κ(Q) = κ∗ (Q)1 l(Iu−Id)
5 ≤Q<(Iu−Id)
3




STEP 2.1: Dealer 2’ s expected proﬁt in a market with preferencing. Fol-
lowing Theorem 1, we consider two cases separately:




















































































 (Q + κ)
2
. (A14)























































































STEP 2.2: Comparison of dealer 2’ s expected proﬁts
CASE 1: κ ≤ (Iu − Id). Then,







v (Q + κ)
2
(3(Iu − Id) − κ)κ2
3(Iu − Id)
2 > 0. (A16)
CASE 2: κ > (Iu − Id). Then,

















Proof of Proposition 2. Similar to that of Theorem 1.





r,1 (i.e., I1 < I2 − κ). In that case dealer 2’s strategy is to
post: a2 = a
0|Q
r,1 −ε. Then, dealer 1 chooses to quote his reservation price: a1 = a
0|Q
r,1 ,





r,1 (i.e., I1 ≥ I2 − κ). In that case dealer 2’s strategy is to
post her cutoﬀ price: a2 = a
κ|Q+κ
r,2 since she cannot proﬁtably trade Q. Moreover,
she internalizes the transaction κ, until the best ask price to match is greater than
her inventory holding costs a
0|κ
r,2. At that point, she routes κ to dealer 1. Thus,
depending on his initial inventory position, dealer 1 is induced to post a more or
less aggressive price (a1 ≶ a
0|κ
r,2). Let us denote I∗
1 the inventory position, which lets





















Solving the latter equation yields to I∗
1 = I2+
Q(Q+3κ)
2κ . Then, when, I1 > I∗
1 dealer 1
is in position to compete with dealer 2 on the transaction κ and posts an aggressive
ask quote: a1 = a
0|κ
r,2 −ε. When I1 < I∗
1, dealer 1 cannot proﬁtably trade κ at a
0|κ
r,2 −ε
and it is optimal to post a1 = a
κ|Q+κ
r,2 − ε. Q.E.D.
36Proof of Corollary 5. Let us denote aI the best oﬀer in a market with internal-
































From proof of Corollary 3, we know that E (a) − E
 
aHS 
= ψ(κ). We obtain
E
 
aI − aHS 
= ψ(κ) − E
 












Second, note that, for the following values for parameters: ρ = 1,   = 99.75$, σ2
v =
1/10,000, Q = 2,500, κ = 10,000, Id = 0 and Iu = 20,000 we get E
 
aI − aHS 
=
−0.0045 < 0. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 4. We proceed by steps.
STEP (i): Determination of the ordinary diﬀerential equations system.














Then the ﬁrst order condition (FOC) yields
  Fκ (v2 (y)) + v′








At equilibrium, if a1 is the optimal strategy (a1(a
0|Q
r,1 ) = y), then v1 (y) must verify
the FOC such that for each y:
  Fκ (v2 (y)) + v′
2 (y)   F′
κ (v2 (y))(y − v1 (y)) = 0. (A21)
Now, given that dealer 1 quotes a1 = (v1)
−1, then dealer 2 chooses y so as to










































37Then the FOC yields :
  F (v1 (y))(1 + κ/Q) + v′







Now, at equilibrium, if a2 is the optimal strategy, then v2 (y) must verify the ﬁrst
order condition of dealer 2 such that for each y:
  F (v1 (y))(1 + κ/Q) + v′
1 (y)   F′ (v1 (y))(y − v2 (y)) = 0. (A23)




  Fκ (v2 (y))
v′
2 (y) = −
1
y − v1 (y)
,
  F′ (v1 (y))
  F (v1 (y))
v′
1 (y) = −
(1 + κ/Q)
y − v2 (y)
.
STEP (ii): Existence of an equilibrium. Given the deﬁnition of   F and   Fκ, the






r,d − v1 (y)
 
(1 + κ/Q)






r,d − v2 (y)
y − v1 (y)
. (A25)




r,d )/2 > a
κ|Q+κ
r,u ,
we can prove that there exists a multiplicity of equilibria parameterized only by asup.














(ii) v2 (asup) = asup,v1 (asup) = a
0|Q
r,d











Proof of Theorem 2. We proceed by proving 4 successive steps. First, we prove
that the inverse ask functions v1 and v2 are uniformely decreasing with the parameter
asup (Step 1). Then, by using this result, we compare dealers’ expected proﬁt accord-













Proposition 4), which constitutes Steps 2 and 3. From these previous steps we deduce









nally, we show that this dominant equilibrium is unique (Step 4). More formal proofs
are available upon request.
Proof of Proposition 5. Suppose that dealer 2 quotes an ask price equal to her
reservation price a2 = a
κ|Q+κ
r,2 (we will prove ultimately that this reply is the best
one). When a1 ≥ a
κ|Q+κ
















































r,d )/2 = asup ≤ a
κ|Q+κ
r,u gives
dealer 1 an equal probability to post the best price. However dealer 1 maximizes his
proﬁt when he quotes a1 = a
κ|Q+κ
r,u . Given the dealer 1’ s best reply, dealer 2 has no
chance to win the unpreferenced order ﬂow and quotes a2 = a
κ|Q+κ
r,2 (since it is not
optimal for dealer 2 to quote a price below her cutoﬀ price). Q.E.D.
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44Notes
1For Nasdaq and Nyse-listed stocks, the so-called “payments for order ﬂow” averaged less
than $0.001 per share for order ﬂow executed by Ameritrade, a preferenced dealer, during the
2006 1
st quarter. Extract from the 11Acl-6 (“Dash Six”) report for Ameritrade.
2Preferenced orders may receive “price improvement”.
3See Chung, Chuwonganant and McCormick (2004) for ﬁgures concerning the Nasdaq and
Hansch, Naik and Viswanathan (1999) for the London Stock Exchange.
4See Davies, Dufour and Scott-Quinn (2006) for the ﬁgures.
5Several empirical studies show that inventory control through price quotes adjustement
plays an important role in the price formation of markets with dedicated liquidity suppliers.
See, among others, Hansch et al (1998) for London Stock Exchange data ; Lyons (1995) or
Bjønnes and Rime (2005) for foreign exchange markets. For NYSE specialist data, see, e.g.,
Madhavan and Smidt (1993), Hasbrouck and Soﬁanos (1993), Madhavan and Soﬁanos (1998)
or Hendershott and Seasholes (2006).
6Since we only consider the sell side, reservation selling prices are simply termed as reser-
vation prices.
7This expression can also be derived when dealers maximize constant absolute risk aversion
(CARA) utility function, combined with the normally distributed risky asset, as in Biais
(1993).
8Order preferencing is often used to cream-skim uninformed orders, as several empirical
studies point out (see, e.g., Easley et al. (1996) or Chung et al. (2006a)). In the present paper,
we do not deal with such an issue and choose to concentrate on the impact of preferencing on
dealers’ inventory control. See, for instance, Battalio and Holden (2001), for cream-skimming
modelling.
9Note that, in our model, Q and κ have necessarily the same direction, since the price
competition on Q determines the transaction price of κ.
10For simplicity, we ignore the eﬀect of risk aversion on preferences by using the ﬁrst order
linear approximation proposed by Biais (1993) and used by Rhodes-Kropft (2005). See de
Frutos and Manzano (2002) for an analysis of the impact of risk-aversion in the inventory
model of Biais (1993).
11That cutoﬀ price may also be obtained in a CARA normal framework.
12In the remaining part of the paper we use the term cutoﬀ price or reservation price for
dealer 2 interchangeably.
13SEC Rule 11acl-5 (“Dash Five”) allows them, however, to discriminate between brokers
receiving or not payment for the order ﬂow.
4514The inside spread in termed as the touch on the LSE. Thus dealers on the best ask price
are denoted by subscript “T”, in reference to Hansch et al. (1998).
15Hansch et al. (1998) point out that, “ [...] this extreme version of the inventory hypothesis
is unlikely to hold in practice because market makers often do not know the inventories of
other dealers and because order ﬂow is preferenced in dealership markets.”
16For stocks without preferencing, Yin (2005) proposes, in an inventory model based on
Biais (1993), to take into account the search costs of the best quote, which could also explain
why dealers with extreme inventories do not execute all public trades.
17Internalization is “[...] analogous to “price matching” in industrial organization economics
and that price matching can be anti-competitive in market equilibrium.” SEC Speech, Ch.
Spatt, May 6, 2005.
18Observe that, if κ = 2(Iu − Id), then a
inf = a
sup.








E(a) in a two-dealer market with 1 preferenced dealer (N=2, M=1)
E(a) in a three-dealer market with 1 preferenced dealer (N=3, M=1)
E(a) in a three-dealer market with 2 preferenced dealers (N=3, M=2)
=Iu-Id
E(a)
Volume of preferenced orders, k
Figure 1. Expected best ask, the number of preferenced dealers varying. This ﬁgure illustrates whether the number of
preferenced M vs. unpreferenced (N −M) dealers matters by analyzing the expected best oﬀers in 3 diﬀerent cases: (i) N = 2 and
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Figure 2. Reservation ask quotes and optimal quotes. In an opaque market without preferencing, a dealer with a reservation
price a
0| Q+κ
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E(a) in a transparent market with preferencing
E(a
c) in a market without preferencing, 
c=HS,B
E(a) in an opaque market 
with preferencing
Figure 3. Expected best ask, the volume of preferenced order ﬂow varying. This ﬁgure illustrates the impact of
preferencing on the expected best oﬀer in case of a transparent market and an opaque market, relative to the level of the expected




















Entire Proof of Theorem 2 for Interested Readers Proof of Theorem 2. Dealers select the Pareto dominant equilibrium from their
point of view, i.e. the equilibrium that maximizes both dealers’ expected proﬁt.
Speciﬁcally, the equilibrium denoted by the subscript (2) is Pareto dominant under
the parameter asup(2) if for each equilibrium denoted by the subscript (1) under other





























We proceed by proving 4 successive lemmas. First, we establish that the inverse
ask functions v1 and v2 are uniformly decreasing with the parameter asup (Lemma
1). Then, by using this lemma, we compare dealers’ expected proﬁt according to








r,d )/2] (see Lemmas









/2. Finally, we show that this Pareto dominant equilibrium
is unique (Lemma 4).
Preliminary remark: Let us deﬁne v
(i)
j for vj under the parameter asup(i) for
j = 1,2. Note that (i) the lower bound ainf(i) is a function of the initial condition on




























Lemma 1 When asup(1) < asup(2), then ainf(1) < ainf(2), v
(1)





2 (y) > v
(2)




Proof : The proof is obtained by contradictions.
1. Proof related to the ﬁrst part of the lemma: When asup(1) < asup(2), then ainf(1) <
ainf(2). Suppose that ainf(1) > ainf(2), then there exists y0 such that
v
(1)

















2 (y) < v
(2)
2 (y) for each y < y0.






















1 (y0) > v
(2)
1 (y0).
Necessarily, there exists y1 such that y1 < y0 and
v
(1)











































2 (y1) > v
(2)
2 (y1).
which is in contradiction with the existence of y0.
2. Proof related to the second part of the Lemma: When asup(1) < asup(2), then...,
v
(1)
1 (y) > v
(2)
1 (y) and v
(1)
2 (y) > v
(2)
2 (y) for y ∈
 
ainf(2),asup(1) 
. Suppose that there
exists y2 such that
(i) v
(1)





2 (y) > v
(2)




































1 (y2) < v
(2)
1 (y2).
2Then, there exists y3 < y2 such that
v
(1)











































2 (y3) < v
(2)
2 (y3),
which is in contradiction with the existence of y2.
Similar arguments apply for proving that v
(1)
2 (y) > v
(2)




Corollary 1 When asup(1) < asup(2), then a
(1)
1 (z) < a
(2)







2 (z) < a
(2)




Let us use deﬁne the following notations
Π
(i)


























Lemma 2 When asup(1) < asup(2), then Π
(1)
1 (z) < Π
(2)





Proof : Let us ﬁrst characterize the expected proﬁt of dealer 1 at bounds (Step 1),
and then we analyze the increase in his expected proﬁt due to a change in the initial
condition (Step 2).
STEP 1. On the lower bound a
0|Q
































On the upper bound a
0|Q










































































































































































Now, suppose that there exists z0 such that: (i) Π
(1)
1 (z0) = Π
(2)
1 (z0) and (ii)
Π
(1)
1 (z) < Π
(2)
1 (z) for each a
0|Q











































   
a
(1)
1 (z0) − z0
 









   
a
(2)






1 (z0) > a
(2)
1 (z0).
4However this inequality is in contradiction with Corollary 1.￿





r,d )/2, the expected proﬁt of dealer 1 is uniformly larger than
any other proﬁts determined under other lower initial conditions.
Lemma 3 When asup(1) < asup(2), then Π
(1)
2 (z) < Π
(2)





Proof : We adopt a similar reasoning for dealer 2.
STEP 1. On the lower bound a
κ|Q+κ



















On the upper bound a
κ|Q+κ
























































































































   



































































































































. In this purpose, we introduce the following
function: g1,2 = v1 ◦ a2.
























































































































































Then, the new system of ordinary diﬀerential equations is

     



























with the following boundary conditions
a2(aκ|Q+κ
r,u ) = ainf, g1,2(aκ|Q+κ
r,u ) = a0|Q
r,u ,
a2 (asup) = asup, g1,2(asup) = a
0|Q
r,d .














































































































































































































































































Given the assumption (i) related to z1, we get
a
(2)
2 (z1) < a
(1)
2 (z1),











































































By using Lemmas 2 and 3, we deduce that there exists a Pareto-Dominant equi-





Lemma 4 The Pareto dominant equilibrium is unique.
Let us prove that the ask price quoted by each dealer is a global maximum on
 
ainf,asup 
























































g1 (asup) = a
κ|Q+κ















We observe that g′









2 (y). Then, by diﬀerentiating
Equation (A25), we obtain
g′








  (2 − v′
1 (y))
(y − v1 (y))
 
.
Assume that there exist two maxima y1 and y2 i.e g1 (y1) = g1 (y0) = 0 with
g′
1 (y1) > 0 and g′
1 (y0) < 0 (which is equivalent to assume that conditions are only
local). Since v′























r,d − v2 (y0)
  v′
2 (y0) < 0 (using Equation (A25))

























r,d − v2 (y0)
  v′
2 (y0) = v′
1 (y0) < 0,
which is in contradiction with Equation (A24).
- The unicity of a maximum sell price for dealer 2
























Suppose that there exist two local maxima z0 and z1, i.e. g2 (z0) = g2 (z1) = 0.
Then, we must have g′
2 (z0) < 0 and g′
2 (z1) > 0.
Observe that
g′
2 (z) = −v′









Using the derivative of Equation (A24)
v
′′
1 (z) = v′
1 (z) ×
(v′
2 (z) − (2 + κ/Q))




2 (z) = −v′
1 (z)
 
(2 + κ/Q) −
((2 + κ/Q) − v′
2 (z))








2 (z1) > 0
(2 + κ/Q) −
((2 + κ/Q) − v′
2 (z1))







Using Equation (A24) , then the latter expression writes also
(2 + κ/Q) −
((2 + κ/Q) − v′
2 (z1))  
a
0|Q
r,d − v1 (z1)
 













r,d − v1 (z1)
 








(2 + α) −
((2 + κ/Q) − v′
















2 (z1) < 0.
Consequently, there cannot exist two local maxima.￿
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